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**Restrictions are prohibitions on action --- the aff isn’t**

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

**Voting issue**

**Limits – they blow the lid off the topic – it’s a whole topic of its own**

**Ground – they jack links to core DAs like deference and credibility – makes being neg impossible**

# 1nc

#### Debt ceiling will pass now – polcap’s key

The Detriot News 9/19/13 (Dale McFeatters, "Another Debt Ceiling Debate?")

The tea party-influenced wing of the House GOP favors passing the CRs but cutting any funds in those bills that would go toward paying for Obamacare. About two dozen House Republicans are in favor of this scheme.¶ But since neither President Barack Obama nor Senate Democrats would go along with this, House Republicans risk shutting down all or parts of the government. The House Republicans’ leadership, which bears no love for Obamacare, thinks this is a terrible idea.¶ National polls and the GOP’s internal polling show that the public would generally blame Republicans for the shutdown and likely take it out on the party in the next election.¶ The beleaguered Republicans who lead the House — Speaker John Boehner, Majority Leader Eric Cantor and whip Kevin McCarthy — prefer to wait until month’s end, when Congress must vote to raise the debt ceiling.¶ Failure to raise the debt limit means the government will begin defaulting on its debts, with dire and unpredictable consequences. Boehner has pledged not to let the government default. But he wants to tie the increase in the debt ceiling to tax reform, which would likely entail cuts in entitlements — anathema to most Democrats.¶ Obama and Senate Democratic leaders say they will not negotiate over the debt limit and have begun making the argument that failing to raise it is unconstitutional and that Congress’ permission might not even be necessary.¶ At a sensitive time in the nation’s economic recovery, the administration could face economic chaos. Younger House Republicans believe Obama would back down. However, faced with growing charges that his leadership is weak and uncertain, the president almost dare not.

#### Political capital is key

Blake 9/18/13 (Aaron, Covers National Politics for the Washington Post, The Washington Post, Post Politics, Carney Assures That Obama 'Has Twisted Arms')

White House press secretary Jay Carney on Wednesday fought back against criticism that President Obama has been disengaged from legislative battles on Capitol Hill.¶ "He has twisted arms," Carney said. "He has used the powers that are available to him to try to convince, persuade, cajole Republicans into doing the sensible thing...."¶ Pressed on Obama's role in the current budget debate and his refusal to negotiate over the debt ceiling, Carney rebuffed the idea that the president isn't involved.¶ “You’re assuming he’s above the fray," Carney said. "He’s not. He’s in the fray. And he was in the fray today, and he'll be in the fray until Congress does the right thing.”

#### Plan costs capital – makes Obama look soft on terror

Banerjee 5/26/13 (Neela, LA Times DC Energy and Environment Correspondent, McClatchy Newspapers, The State Newspaper, "Republicans Criticize Obama's shift on Drone Use")

WASHINGTON, DC — Republicans criticized President Barack Obama on Sunday for what they described as a retreat in the war against terrorism when they said the world’s crises demand a more aggressive, vigilant United States.¶ In a speech Thursday at the National Defense University in Washington, Obama said he would narrow the use of drone attacks against suspected terrorists and seek to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.¶ Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-SC, who serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said on “Fox News Sunday” that he had “never been more worried about national security” and called the president “tone deaf” on the issue.¶ “I see a big difference between the president saying the war’s at an end and whether or not you’ve won the war,” said Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla. “We have still tremendous threats out there, that are building – not declining, building – and to not recognize that, I think, is dangerous in the long run and dangerous for the world.”¶ Democrats such as Sen. Charles Schumer of New York defended the President’s anti-terrorism policy, contending that the revised approach would address concerns about the lack of transparency in the deployment of drones without sacrificing security.

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling collapses the economy –

McAuliff 9/18/13 (Michael, Covers Congres

s for the Huffington Post, "Debt Limit Showdown Could be Catastrophic For Economy:

Analysts")

\*Zandi is the chief economist at Moody's Analytics

Much like Democrats who released [their own report on the topic](http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=f1f34dc1-775b-4bc5-b1a1-739e963f0277), Zandi noted, however, that in the last showdown over the debt ceiling two years ago, the U.S. government's credit rating was downgraded and the stock market tanked.¶ "You can only put the gun to your head so many times before someone's going to make a mistake and pull the trigger, and it's to everyone's detriment," Zandi told Duffy.¶ He gave a crushing summary of the potential impacts of a default.¶ "If you don't raise the debt limit in time, you will be opening an economic Pandora's box. It will be devastating to the economy," he predicted. "If you don't do it in time, confidence will evaporate, consumer confidence will sharply decline, [as well as] investor confidence, business confidence. Businesses will stop hiring, consumers will stop spending, the stock market will fall significantly in value, borrowing costs for businesses and households will rise."¶ "We'll be in the middle of a very, very severe recession, and I don't see how we get out of it," he added.

#### That goes nuclear

Green and Schrage ‘9 (Michael J Green is Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Steven P Schrage is the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a former senior official with the US Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee, Asia Times, 2009 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/KC26Dk01.html>)

Facing the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts at the World Bank and the US Central Intelligence Agency are just beginning to contemplate the ramifications for international stability if there is not a recovery in the next year. For the most part, the focus has been on fragile states such as some in Eastern Europe. However, the Great Depression taught us that a downward global economic spiral can even have jarring impacts on great powers. It is no mere coincidence that the last great global economic downturn was followed by the most destructive war in human history. In the 1930s, economic desperation helped fuel autocratic regimes and protectionism in a downward economic-security death spiral that engulfed the world in conflict. This spiral was aided by the preoccupation of the United States and other leading nations with economic troubles at home and insufficient attention to working with other powers to maintain stability abroad. Today's challenges are different, yet 1933's London Economic Conference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading to next month's London Group of 20 (G-20) meeting. There is no question the US must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its economy. But the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the Barack Obama administration and realize that economics and security are intertwined in most of the critical challenges we face. A disillusioned rising power? Four areas in Asia merit particular attention, although so far the current financial crisis has not changed Asia's fundamental strategic picture. China is not replacing the US as regional hegemon, since the leadership in Beijing is too nervous about the political implications of the financial crisis at home to actually play a leading role in solving it internationally. Predictions that the US will be brought to its knees because China is the leading holder of US debt often miss key points. China's currency controls and full employment/export-oriented growth strategy give Beijing few choices other than buying US Treasury bills or harming its own economy. Rather than creating new rules or institutions in international finance, or reorienting the Chinese economy to generate greater long-term consumer demand at home, Chinese leaders are desperately clinging to the status quo (though Beijing deserves credit for short-term efforts to stimulate economic growth). The greater danger with China is not an eclipsing of US leadership, but instead the kind of shift in strategic orientation that happened to Japan after the Great Depression. Japan was arguably not a revisionist power before 1932 and sought instead to converge with the global economy through open trade and adoption of the gold standard. The worldwide depression and protectionism of the 1930s devastated the newly exposed Japanese economy and contributed directly to militaristic and autarkic policies in Asia as the Japanese people reacted against what counted for globalization at the time. China today is similarly converging with the global economy, and many experts believe China needs at least 8% annual growth to sustain social stability. Realistic growth predictions for 2009 are closer to 5%. Veteran China hands were watching closely when millions of migrant workers returned to work after the Lunar New Year holiday last month to find factories closed and jobs gone. There were pockets of protests, but nationwide unrest seems unlikely this year, and Chinese leaders are working around the clock to ensure that it does not happen next year either. However, the economic slowdown has only just begun and nobody is certain how it will impact the social contract in China between the ruling communist party and the 1.3 billion Chinese who have come to see President Hu Jintao's call for "harmonious society" as inextricably linked to his promise of "peaceful development". If the Japanese example is any precedent, a sustained economic slowdown has the potential to open a dangerous path from economic nationalism to strategic revisionism in China too. Dangerous states It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran have all intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of North Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to suggest either and much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system. Challenges to the democratic model The trend in East Asia has been for developing economies to steadily embrace democracy and the rule of law in order to sustain their national success. But to thrive, new democracies also have to deliver basic economic growth. The economic crisis has hit democracies hard, with Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro's approval collapsing to single digits in the polls and South Korea's Lee Myung-bak and Taiwan's Ma Ying Jeou doing only a little better (and the collapse in Taiwan's exports - particularly to China - is sure to undermine Ma's argument that a more accommodating stance toward Beijing will bring economic benefits to Taiwan). Thailand's new coalition government has an uncertain future after two years of post-coup drift and now economic crisis. The string of old and new democracies in East Asia has helped to anchor US relations with China and to maintain what former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice once called a "balance of power that favors freedom". A reversal of the democratic expansion of the past two decades would not only impact the global balance of power but also increase the potential number of failed states, with all the attendant risk they bring from harboring terrorists to incubating pandemic diseases and trafficking in persons. It would also undermine the demonstration effect of liberal norms we are urging China to embrace at home. Protectionism The collapse of financial markets in 1929 was compounded by protectionist measures such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff act in 1932. Suddenly, the economic collapse became a zero-sum race for autarkic trading blocs that became a key cause of war. Today, the globalization of finance, services and manufacturing networks and the World Trade Organization (WTO) make such a rapid move to trading blocs unlikely. However, protectionism could still unravel the international system through other guises. Already, new spending packages around the world are providing support for certain industries that might be perceived by foreign competitors as unfair trade measures, potentially creating a "Smoot-Hawley 2.0" stimulus effect as governments race to prop up industries. "Buy American" conditionality in the US economic stimulus package earlier this year was watered down somewhat by the Obama administration, but it set a tempting precedent for other countries to put up barriers to close markets.

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The affs restriction backfires – it normalizes and sanitizes paranoid imperial violence

Cooper, 11 -- University of Bradford International Relations and Security Studies Senior Lecturer [Neil, PhD from University of Kent at Canterbury, University of Bradford Associate Dean for Research for the School of Social and International Studies, "Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes of Securitization: Moving Weapons along the Security Continuum," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 32, Issue 1, 2011, tandfonline, accessed 9-5-13, mss]

In this account of contemporary HAC, powerful actors who aim to uphold the status quo principally have a role as agents of resistance to control agendas, not as actors in the production of control regimes. This certainly reﬂects important aspects of contemporary campaigns to regulate pariah weapons but, as I suggest below, it offers a rather incomplete account. Moreover, if such accounts did indeed provide a complete understanding of the dynamics underpinning these control agendas it would certainly represent a novel development, not least because the long history of pariah weapons regulation illustrates the way that weapons taboos frequently reﬂect the interests of the powerful. For example, one factor in the virtual eradication of the gun in 17th and 18th century Japan was that it represented a threat to the warrior class when in the hands of the lower classes.48 The same was true of the rather less successful attempt of the Second Lateran Council to ban the crossbow – a ban partly motivated by the fact that crossbows could pierce the armour of the knight – and a ban that was notably not extended to use against non-Christians.49Similarly, whilst the restrictions on the slave, arms, and liquor trade to Africa embodied in the 1890 Brussels Act were certainly grounded in an ethical discourse, the restrictions imposed on the trade in ﬁrearms were primarily rooted in concerns about the impact of the trade on colonial order. As one British colonial ofﬁcial noted at the time, the restrictions on the small arms trade to Africa reﬂected imperial concern to ‘avoid the development and paciﬁcation of this great continent ... [being] carried out in the face of an enormous population, the majority of whom will probably be armed with ﬁrst-class breechloading riﬂes’.50 The history of pariah weapons regulation would therefore appear to demonstrate a persistent link between the material and political interests of states and / or powerful elites and the emergence of pariah weapons regulation. To be sure, the material and political interests of the same, or other, powerful actors also provide countervailing pressures – the immediate interests of nobles in winnings wars with crossbows mostly won out over their broader class interests,51 whilst colonial competition to secure arms proﬁts and local allies mitigated the impact of the various restrictions on the ﬁrearms trade in the late 19th century.52 But the point is that whilst the genesis of earlier attempts at pariah regulation may, in part, be explained by reference to particular securitizing moments of intervention, the impact of such interventions can only be understood by locating them in particular political economies of power. What is surprising therefore about accounts of post-Cold War humanitarian arms control is that this long history has largely failed to prompt consideration of the way in which contemporary regulation might also reﬂect the interests of powerful states and other actors, albeit in ways that are subject to similar countervailing pressures – an issue that will be taken up below. Pariah Weapons, Heroic Weapons, and Legitimized Military Technology A further recurring theme in the history of pariah regulation is the way in which **restrictions on pariah weapons are** often **related** in some way **to the construction of a** broad arena **of legitimized military tech**nology**.** A particularly extreme example of this is the way in which pariah weapons are sometimes constructed as the antithesis of the ‘heroic weapon’ – a weapon deemed to embody positive values such as honour and / or which is deemed central to national defence. Thus, the series of relatively successful Acts implemented in England between 1508 and 1542 banning crossbows were largely rooted in a concern to preserve the use of the heroic longbow, deemed central to a long line of English military successes.53 The Japanese ban on the gun was similarly connected to the romanticization of the heroic samurai sword as the visible form of one’s honour, as associated with grace of movement in battle and even its status as a work of art.54 In effect both the crossbow in 16th century England and the gun in 17th and 18th century Japan became the ‘other’ which deﬁned legitimized military technologies and militarism. Redford makes much the same point about English attitudes to the submarine, which was constructed as an ‘other’ partly because of the British romanticization of the battleship (‘the upper class or aristocracy of warships’)55 as central to British security and linked to British notions of valour and honour in the conduct of war. This highlights the ways in which the security meaning associated with particular sets of weapons technology are not just a function of the framings speciﬁc to that technology but are also relational, with the representation of one weapon playing an important role in constituting the meaning of another (albeit in sometimes unexpected ways), and vice versa. Not surprisingly perhaps, similar themes also help explain the contemporary taboos constructed around particular sets of military technology such as cluster munitions. Cluster Munitions What is particularly striking about the campaign against cluster munitions is not its success in banning an inhumane weapon but the fact that this success was achieved at a moment in history when, in absolute terms at least, cluster munitions use had fallen from the peak years of use during the Vietnam era (see Table 2). In the latter period cluster bombs such as the CBU-24 represented a ‘major increase in battleﬁeld lethality’ yet its development and deployment was ‘accomplished with no public debate and relatively little subsequent protest’.56 Indeed, for the American military, ‘CBUs were categorised as a standard weapon, to be taken off the shelf – “conventional ironmongery”.57 This is not to suggest that American use of cluster munitions in this period went unremarked. There were certainly some critics at the time who argued that such weapons were inhumane.58 There were also attempts, sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Sweden in particular, to promote restrictions on cluster munitions in negotiations in the 1970s on the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.59 The point is however, that these efforts never achieved traction either with diplomats or with a wider public in the way that the issue would 30 years later. The labels attached to cluster munitions and also landmines only changed dramatically as the move into the post-Cold War era occurred when they moved from being treated as unproblematic elements in global military arsenals to a form of ‘technology non grata’ – weaponry deemed immoral, inhumane, and indiscriminate. Crucially, such a successful process of stigmatization was only made feasible in the context of a post-Cold War widening of the security label to incorporate the notion of human security as a referent object; by the turn to casting security interventions in humanitarian terms; and the representation of modern weaponry as humane because of its perceived capacity to better discriminate between civilians and combatants. The widening and deepening of the security label created the permissive environment necessary for activists to reframe cluster munitions (and APMs) as threats to the human. At the same time, the discussion of intervention in humanitarian terms60 and of precision weapons as instruments of humane warfare61 created a legitimized discursive space into which campaigners could insert a re-representation of landmines and cluster munitions technology as inhumane. Indeed, such a re-representation only exerted a powerful appeal because it was consonant with both the predominant framing of security threats in a postCold War world and a new divide between good and odious military technology. This is not to suggest that such developments reﬂected some teleology in which security and arms control practice progressively evolved to be more humane. As Krause and Latham have noted, for example, whilst the post-Cold War era concern with the impact of ‘inhumane weapons’ represents a notable shift compared with the Cold War arms control agenda, it does have similarities with the late 19th century when a Western discourse of civilized warfare was also prominent. One corollary of this – then as now – was a concern to specify what constituted an ‘inhumane weapon’62 manifest, for example, in the negotiations in the Hague conferences over problem technologies such as the dum dum bullet. As Michael Howard has suggested though, whilst initiatives such as the Hague conferences achieved notable successes, they also reﬂected the fact that liberal internationalists had ‘abandoned their original objects of preventing war and building peace in favour of making war more humane for those actually ﬁghting it’.63 The prohibitions on cluster munitions and also APMs can be understood as similarly ambiguous developments. On the one hand, the legitimizing discourse of Western militaries and arms ﬁrms was turned against them in order to generate powerful taboos against particular categories of weapons – even in the face of opposition from these militaries. The language of state security was coopted to promote human security, to preserve life, and prevent threats to its existence. On the other hand, the same prohibitions can ultimately be understood less as progressive initiatives imposed on foot-dragging states by the bottom-up power of global civil society and more as performative acts that simultaneously function to codify aspects of a new set of criteria for judging international respectability in a post-Cold War era, to reinforce the security framings of the era and to legitimize those categories of weapons successfully constructed as precise, discriminate, and thus humane. Indeed, **to the extent** that states such as **the U**nited **S**tates have been able to **circumscribe their commitments** on landmines etc. **they** have been able to **beneﬁt** **from the** broader legitimizing effects **of** speciﬁc **weapons taboos** without being unduly constrained **by** the **speciﬁc regulatory requirements** they have given rise to. Moreover, as already noted, the presence of pariah weapons regulation is not necessarily a sign of a more general shift to the tighter regulation of the arms trade – quite the reverse in some cases. Thus, any evaluation of the overall impact of such regulation on global and local security also has to take into account the broader system of arms regulation in which it is located, and the relationship that exists between pariah regulation and this broader system. The next two sections will offer some observations on these issues. Models of Economy and Models of Arms Trade Regulation The approach adopted to the regulation of the arms trade in general does not only reﬂect the security labels attached to particular kinds of technology or the direct interests powerful actors may have in constraining such technology. Regulatory approaches to the arms trade are also a function of the particular paradigms of political economy that dominate in speciﬁc era. In part this is because they link into particular understandings of what constitutes economic security. But the link between regulation and the paradigms of political economy go beyond this, reﬂecting a much more fundamental common sense about economy and trade. For example, the rise of mercantilism from about the 1600s meant the previous dominance of private arms traders was replaced by that of government arsenals64 and the emphasis on autarky encouraged a more restrictive approach to the regulation of arms transfers.65 In England for example, Queen Elizabeth I issued an order in 1574 restricting the number of guns to be cast in England to those ‘for the only use of the Realm’66 and further Ordnances restricting the export of arms were passed in 1610 and 1614.67 In contrast, the shift in economic ideology from mercantilism to capitalism led to the more laissez-faire approach to the regulation of arms transfers in the late 19th century already described above. Britain moved to a more laissez-faire basis from 1862 onwards, France passed legislation in 1885 reinstituting the private manufacture of arms and also repealed the law prohibiting exports.68 Indeed, this was an era in which the Prussian government did not even feel able to compel Krupp to abjure exports to Austria on the eve of war with that country in 1866.69 Economic philosophy also shaped both discourse and practice on the regulation of the arms trade in the aftermath of World War I. Against the background of what Buzan and Waever have described as a broader attempt to ‘construct war as a threat to civilisation’ after World War I70 private arms manufacturers were particularly castigated for the role they had supposedly played in fomenting war fever to promote sales, a role facilitated by their alleged control over the press in many countries.71 This partly explained the attempts in 1919 and 1925 to develop international agreements on the regulation of the arms trade, although in reality a broader set of international order and security concerns were also at work (see below). However, the 1919 and 1925 agreements never received the necessary ratiﬁcations to come into force (although they did have important legacy effects) and the laissez faire approach to the arms trade still predominated throughout the 1920s. It was only in the 1930s that concern about the activities of the arms manufacturers gained particular salience in both the media and policy circles. In part this may have been a function of the deteriorating international situation, but as Harkavy has argued, it was also a function of the fact that the Great Depression had prompted widespread doubts about the general viability of the capitalist system.72Consequently, nationalization and greater government oversight of the arms industry was presented by campaigners and, indeed, some governments, as a vehicle to ensure arms proﬁts were not pursued at the expense of either state interests or world peace. Although nationalization was, with the exception of France73 mostly avoided, by the mid-1930s most of the major arms producing states had begun to develop formal defence export licensing systems.74 In other words, this was the moment when the institutions and processes were established that would produce the many thousands of ordinary extraordinary export licensing decisions that now occur on a weekly basis, the point of genesis for a particular habitus of a particular set of security professionals. This shift was not solely a function of debates about the role of arms merchants in World War I, nor was it purely a consequence of the doubts about unmanaged capitalism sowed by the Great Depression. Issues of power and security as well as the moments of intervention represented by successive attempts to agree international arms regulation all played their role in this shift (see below). Nevertheless, attitudes to economy were an important part of the mix. In the Cold War, the regulation of arms transfers was structured so that it was simultaneously permissive vis-a`-vis transfers to allies and highly restrictive vis-a`-vis allies of the Soviet Union. In the West at least, these security rationales overlapped with the dominance of Keynesian approaches to the economy in which the preservation of defence production emerged not only as a strategic imperative but as a form of welfare militarism – aimed at maintaining jobs, stimulating economies in times of recession, and preserving key technology sectors. This implied the further extension of government oversight of arms sales (albeit principally on a national basis rather than through international negotiation) and government’s role in the promotion of arms sales. It also meant that arms sales were pursued primarily (if not exclusively) for political rather than economic reasons. This contrasted sharply with the late 19th century and even inter-war years when private industry and the search for arms proﬁts were the principle factors driving supply. However, the end of the Cold War coincided with (and reinforced) underlying shifts in conceptions of economy and security that inﬂuenced the debate on arms transfer control. In terms of economy, the neoliberal agenda had already been thoroughly mainstreamed in the policy discourse of governments. Greed was good, proﬁt was better and market principles were the order of the day. In terms of domestic defence procurement policies this was reﬂected in a shift to the much wider application of competition policy, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.75 In terms of the approach to major arms transfers it underpinned the shift to a more commercial attitude that had been gradually evolving from the 1960s onwards. Already by 1988 one analyst could note that ‘the political factors that dominated the arms trade in the recent past are yielding to market forces... the arms trade is returning to its patterns prior to World War II, when the trade in military equipment was not dramatically different from the trade in many other industrial products’.76The comparison with the pre-World War II era is perhaps exaggerated – not least because the frameworks of national oversight and national export promotion are far more extensive, as are the frameworks of international regulation. Nevertheless, whilst one feature of the post-Cold War era has been the proliferation of international or regional initiatives to ostensibly restrain arms proliferation, an equally notable feature has been the relaxation of restrictions on arms supplies, particularly to allies. Both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations in the United States have attempted to ease restrictions on exports to key allies, most notably in the form of defence trade cooperation treaties with Australia and the United Kingdom announced in 2007, although these have yet to be ratiﬁed by the Senate.77 The effect of these agreements will be to permit the licence-free transfer of defence goods between the United States and each of the signatories.78 The Obama administration has, in addition, committed itself to a radical overhaul of the American export control system to make it easier to export weapons to American allies and to emerging markets such as China. For example, the administration has claimed that in the case of items related to tanks and military vehicles, the new rules would remove 74 per cent of the items currently on the US Munitions List.79 In other words, the export of brake pads for tanks may no longer be subject to a regime of extraordinary measures. Similar processes have been at work in other countries. For example, in 2002 the United Kingdom announced changes to its methodology for assessing licence applications for components to be incorporated into military equipment for onward export, a reform generally interpreted as opening ‘a signiﬁcant export licensing loophole’,80 whilst in 2007 the French government announced it would ease restrictions on products moving within the European Union.81 At the same time as this occurred NGOs became more focussed on the security outcomes stemming from the trade in small arms and landmines. To the extent that NGOs and academics have engaged with the issue of major conventional arms transfers, they have tended to follow the lead set by government and industry by engaging with the economic rationale for defence exports – albeit in an attempt to debunk them.82The combined effect of this has been to give a more central place to a technocratic discourse on major weapons transfers focussed on their economic costs and beneﬁts to suppliers. This is not to suggest that strategic rationales for arms transfers have disappeared completely – they still remain important factors in speciﬁc cases, particularly post-9/11. Nevertheless, as Hartung has noted, with the end of the Cold War, the economic rationales for arms sales ‘moved to the forefront’.83One corollary of this greater emphasis on the economics of arms sales has been the post-Cold War deproblematization of major arms transfers84 at least in terms of debates about their security outcomes. Today, such sales are primarily discussed (by exporters at least, if not by recipients and their neighbours) in the language of the technocrat and the banker - the language of jobs, ﬁnancing terms, market share, and performance evaluation. Indeed, both government and NGO security concerns about the negative effects of the arms trade have bifurcated – with concern focussed either on the problem of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (problematized primarily in terms of their potential acquisition by rogues) or, at the other end of the scale, on issues such as small arms (primarily problematized in terms of the illicit rather than the legal trade in such weapons). Arms Trade Regulation and the Security Problematique If neoliberalism has facilitated a more permissive approach to arms transfer regulation then this raises the question of why any limits have been introduced at all? As already noted above, one part of the answer is rooted in the relationship between legitimized and heroic weapons and those military technologies that lie outside the boundaries of the heroic and the legitimized. Being the ‘other’ of legitimized military technology facilitates successful problematization and indeed ‘extra-securitisation’. Additionally however, the architecture of global arms trade regulation has been transformed in the post-Cold War era along with the transformation in the objects of security that accompanied the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the global architecture of conventional arms trade regulation, like arms control more generally, was principally focussed on managing East –West tensions. One consequence was a substantial extension of the range of dual-use goods invested with security labels in relation to trade with Eastern Europe, most manifest in debates in the early 1950s between the United States and European states over the operation of CoCoM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls).85 In contrast, the developing world was merely an object of security competition between the superpowers and therefore a site for the supply of arms to allies. With the dissolution of the Soviet threat the focus has turned more to the management of North–South relations as the developing world has been reconstructed as the source of diverse security threats86 and as humanitarian intervention has resurrected similar concerns with the maintenance of order in the developing world that animated the arms restrictions in the Brussels Act. One manifestation of this has been in the reframing of small arms as instruments of disorder rather than the means to shore up Cold War allies. A further example is the replacement of the CoCom regime with the Wasennaar Arrangement, focussed particularly on restricting transfers to pariah regimes in the global South. This shift in focus is also manifest in the signiﬁcant rise in the use of arms embargoes in the post-Cold War era. For example, between 1945 and 1990 only two mandatory embargoes were imposed globally, on Rhodesia and Africa, respectively. Since the 1990s there have been two voluntary and 27 mandatory cases of sanctions, the vast majority of which have been aimed at actors in Africa.87 Sanctions, just like the efforts to control arms to Africa in the late 19th century have not been hugely successful in reducing the supply of weapons to combatants. Nevertheless, they can be understood as animated by much the same desire to maintain order in the peripheries of the world, particularly in a context where Western powers have once again taken on a greater responsibility for policing and managing instability in the developing world. Thus, the post-Cold War regulation of the conventional arms trade is simultaneously characterized by a relatively more permissive approach to arms transfers in general but also a redirection of controls away from the governance of East – West relations and towards the governance of North –South relations and particularly the disciplining of those actors framed as rogue or pariah in the security narratives of dominant actors. The campaign to promote an arms trade treaty may yet produce a more meaningful architecture of arms transfer control – the jury is out. However the framing of the Arms Trade Treaty to the defence industry is perhaps instructive. For example, the UK’s Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control has noted, the ATT ‘... is about ... export controls that will stop weapons ending up in the hands of terrorists, insurgents, violent criminal gangs, or in the hands of dictators’.88 It should also be noted that current efforts to develop a global agreement on the arms trade echo late 19thth and early 20thth century initiatives to govern the international arms trade, most notably: the Brussels Act, the 1919 St Germain Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and the 1925 Arms Trafﬁc Convention. Although the latter two never received the necessary ratiﬁcations to come into force both were animated by the same imperial concern to prevent disorder in the colonies that had underpinned the Brussels Act. As Stone has noted with regards to the St Germain convention for example, ‘there was little doubt among representatives in Paris [where the Convention was signed] that keeping arms out of African and Asian hands was St Germain’s chief task’.89Accordingly, the convention imposed far stricter restrictions on sales to these areas as well as a ban on arms shipments to ‘any country which refuses to accept the tutelage under which it has been placed’.90 Indeed, although the convention never came into being, European powers nevertheless agreed informally to carry out its provisions in Africa and the Middle East.91 The 1925 convention similarly imposed more severe restrictions on exports to special zones that covered most of Africa and parts of what had been the Ottoman Empire.92 Thus, viewed against this broader history of arms regulation, negotiations on a putative Arms Trade Treaty (rather like action on APMs or cluster munitions) do not represent a novel post-Cold War development that symbolizes progress on an emancipatory human security agenda consonant with the promotion of local and global peace. Instead, it reﬂects the emergence of particular sets of relationships between power, interest, economy, security, and legitimized military technologies that in turn create the conditions of emergence for historically contingent architectures of global regulation. Conclusion The preceding analysis has a number of implications for campaigners, but also speaks to the debates about the utility of the securitization framework outlined at the start of this article. First, it provides support for Abrahamson’s notion of the security spectrum. Viewed in a more historical perspective, what is notable about the post-Cold War emergence of a humanitarian arms control agenda is the way in which action on landmines, cluster munitions, and even small arms have been made possible by a quite dramatic transformation in the way such technology is represented. They have, in Abrahamson’s formulation, been moved along the ‘spectrum of security’ from normal, run-of-the mill, unproblematic technologies of killing, to ones of extra special concern. Conversely, one of the features of the post-Cold War era is the way in which the security labels attached to major weapons transfers have, in general, actually moved in the other direction. Whilst such transfers still remain clearly within the domain of security it is, nevertheless, possible to conceive the post-Cold War trade in major weapons as having been relatively desecuritized. Second, the analysis highlights the relational elements that can be involved in processes of securitization and desecuritization. In the case of the landmines ban this manifested itself in the way campaigners engaged in simultaneous processes of securitization of APMs (with respect to the human as referent object) and (relative) desecuritization (with respect to the state as referent object) that worked to mutually reinforce the case for a ban. In the case of pariah weapons generally, whilst there are a number of factors that explain their stigmatization, one factor can be the way their particular qualities are depicted as the antithesis of those possessed by legitimized and particularly heroic weapons. Conversely, the stigmatization of pariah weapons works to delineate other weapons as normal and legitimate. There is therefore a process of mutual constitution that is at work in the way different sets of weapons technology are framed and understood. Third, the preceding analysis illustrates the relevance of Floyd’s argument that processes of securitization or desecuritization can be positive and negative, particularly when considered in terms of their emancipatory effects. As noted above, in the case of landmines a process of relative desecuritization vis-a`-vis the state combined with a process of extra-securitization vis-a`-vis the human to bring about the production of a ban widely considered to have produced positive security outcomes for individuals, communities, and the human as a collective. In contrast, the relative desecuritization of major weapons transfers represents a much more ambiguous development. It could, of course, be argued that such a change in the security labels attached to the weapons holdings of neighbouring states would not only reﬂect but reinforce a move to more peaceable relations. In addition, the relative deproblematization of defence transfers might be conceived as a positive development, particularly for states that possess minimal domestic defence industrial capacity, and are threatened by hostile neighbours. At the same time however, such a shift along the spectrum of security arguably represents a quite regressive development when applied to the issue of arms transfers. This is particularly the case given that, irrespective of the powerful ways in which the security labels attached to major weapons are shaped by discourse and other forms of representation, they still possess a residual materiality, however thin, that is characterized by their capacity to facilitate the organized prosecution of violence. More generally, the transfer of such technologies can also be viewed as symptomatic of a world characterized by deeply problematic higher order paradigms of security and economy. At the very least then, the relative (if not complete) desecuritization of major arms transfers would appear to raise further questions about the Copenhagen School’s normative commitment to desecuritization. Although more accurately, it highlights the effects that come from ratcheting down the security labels attached to ‘normal’ arms transfers and subjecting them to the kind of standard bureaucratic routines highlighted by Bigo, albeit the routines of the export licencing process in this case. One consequence, is that the many thousands of export licences granted for the transfer of weapons other than landmines, cluster munitions, and small arms are far less likely to become the object of public scrutiny or become subject to intense public and political contestation about the security effects of such exports. In this sense at least, the switch from a Cold War arms transfer system where security motivations for exports often predominated to one where economic motivations are more to the fore, has also been accompanied by a corresponding depoliticization of contemporary transfers, a phenomenon that highlights the problematic nature of the neat division between politicized and securitized issues outlined in the CS conception of securitization and one that highlights the downside of even partial moves towards the desecuritization end of the security spectrum. Fourth, the success of campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions demonstrates how ‘moments of intervention’ undertaken on behalf of the voiceless by supposedly weak securitizing actors such as NGOs can, nevertheless, produce quite effective securitizations – in this case, the hyper-securitization of particular weapons technologies. Both campaigns also highlighted the ways in which actors can utilize media images and, through survivor activism that extended to the conference room, provide a context for the body to speak security. Moreover, the success of these campaigns highlights the ways in which the language of threat, survival, and security can be deployed to achieve positive security outcomes. At the same time however, the success of the humanitarian arms control agenda around landmines and cluster munitions in particular was only achieved because NGOs adopted exactly the same discourse around humanitarianism, human security and weapons precision that has been deployed to legitimize post-Cold War liberal peace interventionism and in the marketing of new weapons developments. On one reading, this might point to the potential for actors to deploy dominant forms of security speech in order to achieve progressive ends. On a more pessimistic reading however, it also highlights the profound limits involved in such approaches. To the extent that the extra-securitization of pariah technologies such as landmines has facilitated the relative desecuritization of major conventional weapons transfers it has also made the current framework of control look like an example of ethical advance at the same time as creating space for the deproblematization of arms transfers in general. Ultimately then, the moments of intervention represented by the campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions were successful because they did not threaten, and in many ways were quite consistent with, the dominant security paradigm and security narratives of the post-Cold War era. Equally, whilst the regularized routines and working practices of the security professionals of the export licensing process are certainly important in understanding the treatment of defence transfers, this body of professionals were themselves, brought into being as a result of historical changes in the fundamental assumptions about security and economy. Moreover, their very working practices and modes of behaviour are currently being altered as a result of similar fundamental shifts in the paradigms of security and economy which, in turn, are a function of particular combinations of power and interest. Although these shifts certainly predated the post-Cold War era, they have become particularly concretized in this era. One consequence of all this is that a loud ethical discourse around the restriction of landmines, cluster munitions, and small arms has gone hand in hand with recent rises in both global military expenditure and arms transfers. For example, overall, world defence expenditure in 2008 was estimated to be $1,464 billion (of which NATO countries accounted for 60 per cent and OECD countries 72 per cent) representing a 45 per cent increase in real terms since 1999,93whilst global arms sales were 22 per cent higher in real terms for the period 2005– 2009 than for the preceding period 2000– 2004.94 Moreover, largely because of the dominance of American and European defence spending, the defence trade is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the United States and to a lesser extent, European companies. For example, in 2006 American and European companies accounted for an estimated 92.7 per cent of the arms sales of the world’s 100 largest defence companies.95 Most arms trade NGOs have largely neglected issues such as the rises in defence expenditure in major weapons states such as the United States, intra-northern trade in arms, and the dominant role played by Western companies in the arms trade, in favour of an agenda that conceives the South – and in particular pariah actors in sub-Saharan Africa – as the primary object of conventional arms trade regulation.96With regard to transfers of small arms and major conventional weapons it might be argued that this, at least, also requires impressive self-abnegation from arms trade proﬁts on the part of powerful states in the international system. In practice however, international initiatives such as the EU Code or the Wassennaar Arrangement, national export regulations of the major weapons states and the local initiatives of client states mostly combine to produce a cartography of prohibition that corresponds more closely with the disciplinary geographies advocated by the powerful rather than any global map of militarism and injustice. One illustration of this is the way in which a recent review of British defence export legislation downgraded long-range missiles and the ‘heroic’ Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV – the Maxim gun of modern imperial wars) from a category A classiﬁcation (goods such as cluster munitions whose supply is prohibited) to the less restrictive category B,97 whilst in 2010, the Afghan government proscribed the import, use, and sale of Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer because it is one of the elements used in the making of IEDs.98 More generally, as one recent econometric analysis of major weapons transfers from the Britain, France, Germany, and the United States concluded, despite much rhetoric about the need for a more ethical approach to arms sales from governments in all these countries: Neither human rights abuses nor autocratic polity would appear to reduce the likelihood of countries receiving Western arms, or reduce the relative share of a particular exporter’s weapons they receive. In fact, human rights abusing countries are actually more likely to receive weapons from the US, while autocratic regimes emerge as more likely recipients of weaponry from France and the UK.99 Of course, arms trade NGOs have often been the ﬁrst to highlight such hypocrisies and the work of most organizations include, to a greater or lesser extent, elements of critique or advocacy that might be considered transformational. However, one of the principle features of arms trade activism in the post-Cold War era is the extent to which many NGOs have downgraded radical critique in exchange for insider inﬂuence and government funding.100 Instead, activism has largely been aimed at promoting tactical reform within an overarching economic and security paradigm that justiﬁes intervention, regulation, and transformation of the South whilst (with the exception of token action on landmines, etc.) leaving the vast accumulation of Western armaments largely unproblematized. The logic of this analysis then, is that there needs to be a far greater problematization of military expenditure by the major powers, of the so-called ‘legitimate’ trade in defence goods, including intraNorthern trade, and a problematization of the predominance of Western defence companies in global arms markets. In short, campaigners needs to return to a strategic contestation of global militarism rather than searching for tactical campaign victories dependent on accommodation with the language and economic and security paradigms of contemporary military humanism.

**That causes endless warfare**

Bacevich, 5 -- Boston University international relations professor [A. J., retired career officer in the United States Army, former director of Boston University's Center for International Relations (from 1998 to 2005), *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by Wa*r, 2005 accessed 9-4-13, mss]

Today as never before in their history Americans are enthralled with military power. The global military supremacy that the United States presently enjoys--and is bent on perpetuating-has become central to our national identity. More than America's matchless material abundance or even the effusions of its pop culture, the nation's arsenal of high-tech weaponry and the soldiers who employ that arsenal have come to signify who we are and what we stand for. When it comes to war, Americans have persuaded themselves that the United States possesses a peculiar genius. Writing in the spring of 2003, the journalist Gregg Easterbrook observed that "the extent of American military superiority has become almost impossible to overstate." During Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. forces had shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that they were "the strongest the world has ever known, . . . stronger than the Wehrmacht in r94o, stronger than the legions at the height of Roman power." Other nations trailed "so far behind they have no chance of catching up. ""˜ The commentator Max Boot scoffed at comparisons with the German army of World War II, hitherto "the gold standard of operational excellence." In Iraq, American military performance had been such as to make "fabled generals such as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian seem positively incompetent by comparison." Easterbrook and Booz concurred on the central point: on the modern battlefield Americans had located an arena of human endeavor in which their flair for organizing and deploying technology offered an apparently decisive edge. As a consequence, the United States had (as many Americans have come to believe) become masters of all things military. Further, American political leaders have demonstrated their intention of tapping that mastery to reshape the world in accordance with American interests and American values. That the two are so closely intertwined as to be indistinguishable is, of course, a proposition to which the vast majority of Americans subscribe. Uniquely among the great powers in all of world history, ours (we insist) is an inherently values-based approach to policy. Furthermore, we have it on good authority that the ideals we espouse represent universal truths, valid for all times. American statesmen past and present have regularly affirmed that judgment. In doing so, they validate it and render it all but impervious to doubt. Whatever momentary setbacks the United States might encounter, whether a generation ago in Vietnam or more recently in Iraq, this certainty that American values are destined to prevail imbues U.S. policy with a distinctive grandeur. The preferred language of American statecraft is bold, ambitious, and confident. Reflecting such convictions, policymakers in Washington nurse (and the majority of citizens tacitly endorse) ever more grandiose expectations for how armed might can facilitate the inevitable triumph of those values. In that regard, George W. Bush's vow that the United States will "rid the world of evil" both echoes and amplifies the large claims of his predecessors going at least as far back as Woodrow Wilson. Coming from Bush the war- rior-president, the promise to make an end to evil is a promise to destroy, to demolish, and to obliterate it. One result of this belief that the fulfillment of America's historic mission begins with America's destruction of the old order has been to revive a phenomenon that C. Wright Mills in the early days of the Cold War described as a "military metaphysics**"-a tendency to see international problems as military problems and to** discountthe likelihood of findinga solution except through military means.To state the matter bluntly, Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism, manifesting itself in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. To a degree without precedent in U.S. history, Americans have come to define the nation's strength and well-being in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals? Already in the 19905 America's marriage of a militaristic cast of mind with utopian ends had established itself as the distinguishing element of contemporary U.S. policy. The Bush administrations response to the hor- rors of 9/11 served to reaffirm that marriage, as it committed the United States to waging an open-ended war on a global scale. Events since, notably the alarms, excursions, and full-fledged campaigns comprising the Global War on Terror, have fortified and perhaps even sanctified this marriage. Regrettably, those events, in particular the successive invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, advertised as important milestones along the road to ultimate victory have further dulled the average Americans ability to grasp the significance of this union, which does not serve our interests and may yet prove our undoing. The New American Militarism examines the origins and implications of this union and proposes its annulment. Although by no means the first book to undertake such an examination, The New American Militarism does so from a distinctive perspective. The bellicose character of U.S. policy after 9/11, culminating with the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, has, in fact, evoked charges of militarism from across the political spectrum. Prominent among the accounts advancing that charge are books such as The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, by Chalmers Johnson; Hegemony or Survival: Americas Quest for Global Dominance, by Noam Chomsky; Masters of War; Militarism and Blowback in the Era of American Empire, edited by Carl Boggs; Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions, by Clyde Prestowitz; and Incoherent Empire, by Michael Mann, with its concluding chapter called "The New Militarism." Each of these books appeared in 2003 or 2004. Each was not only writ- ten in the aftermath of 9/11 but responded specifically to the policies of the Bush administration, above all to its determined efforts to promote and justify a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. As the titles alone suggest and the contents amply demonstrate, they are for the most part angry books. They indict more than explain, and what- ever explanations they offer tend to be ad hominem. The authors of these books unite in heaping abuse on the head of George W Bush, said to combine in a single individual intractable provincialism, religious zealotry, and the reckless temperament of a gunslinger. Or if not Bush himself, they fin- ger his lieutenants, the cabal of warmongers, led by Vice President Dick Cheney and senior Defense Department officials, who whispered persua- sively in the president's ear and used him to do their bidding. Thus, accord- ing to Chalmers Johnson, ever since the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, Cheney and other key figures from that war had "Wanted to go back and finish what they started." Having lobbied unsuccessfully throughout the Clinton era "for aggression against Iraq and the remaking of the Middle East," they had returned to power on Bush's coattails. After they had "bided their time for nine months," they had seized upon the crisis of 9/1 1 "to put their theories and plans into action," pressing Bush to make Saddam Hussein number one on his hit list." By implication, militarism becomes something of a conspiracy foisted on a malleable president and an unsuspecting people by a handful of wild-eyed ideologues. By further implication, the remedy for American militarism is self-evi- dent: "Throw the new militarists out of office," as Michael Mann urges, and a more balanced attitude toward military power will presumably reassert itself? As a contribution to the ongoing debate about U.S. policy, The New American Militarism rejects such notions as simplistic. It refuses to lay the responsibility for American militarism at the feet of a particular president or a particular set of advisers and argues that no particular presidential election holds the promise of radically changing it. Charging George W. Bush with responsibility for the militaristic tendencies of present-day U.S. for- eign policy makes as much sense as holding Herbert Hoover culpable for the Great Depression: Whatever its psychic satisfactions, it is an exercise in scapegoating that lets too many others off the hook and allows society at large to abdicate responsibility for what has come to pass. The point is not to deprive George W. Bush or his advisers of whatever credit or blame they may deserve for conjuring up the several large-scale campaigns and myriad lesser military actions comprising their war on ter- ror. They have certainly taken up the mantle of this militarism with a verve not seen in years. Rather it is to suggest that well before September 11, 2001 , and before the younger Bush's ascent to the presidency a militaristic predisposition was already in place both in official circles and among Americans more generally. In this regard, 9/11 deserves to be seen as an event that gave added impetus to already existing tendencies rather than as a turning point. For his part, President Bush himself ought to be seen as a player reciting his lines rather than as a playwright drafting an entirely new script. In short, the argument offered here asserts that present-day **American militarism** has deep roots in the American past. It **represents a bipartisan project.** As a result, it is unlikely to disappear anytime soon, a point obscured by the myopia and personal animus tainting most accounts of how we have arrived at this point. The New American Militarism was conceived not only as a corrective to what has become the conventional critique of U.S. policies since 9/11 but as a challenge to the orthodox historical context employed to justify those policies. In this regard, although by no means comparable in scope and in richness of detail, it continues the story begun in Michael Sherry's masterful 1995 hook, In the Shadow of War an interpretive history of the United States in our times. In a narrative that begins with the Great Depression and spans six decades, Sherry reveals a pervasive American sense of anxiety and vulnerability. In an age during which War, actual as well as metaphorical, was a constant, either as ongoing reality or frightening prospect, national security became the axis around which the American enterprise turned. As a consequence, a relentless process of militarization "reshaped every realm of American life-politics and foreign policy, economics and technology, culture and social relations-making America a profoundly different nation." Yet Sherry concludes his account on a hopeful note. Surveying conditions midway through the post-Cold War era's first decade, he suggests in a chapter entitled "A Farewell to Militarization?" that America's preoccupation with War and military matters might at long last be waning. In the mid- 1995, a return to something resembling pre-1930s military normalcy, involving at least a partial liquidation of the national security state, appeared to be at hand. Events since In the Shadow of War appear to have swept away these expectations. The New American Militarism tries to explain why and by extension offers a different interpretation of America's immediate past. The upshot of that interpretation is that far from bidding farewell to militariza- tion, the United States has nestled more deeply into its embrace. f ~ Briefly told, the story that follows goes like this. The new American militarism made its appearance in reaction to the I96os and especially to Vietnam. It evolved over a period of decades, rather than being sponta- neously induced by a particular event such as the terrorist attack of Septem- ber 11, 2001. Nor, as mentioned above, is present-day American militarism the product of a conspiracy hatched by a small group of fanatics when the American people were distracted or otherwise engaged. Rather, it devel- oped in full view and with considerable popular approval. The new American militarism is the handiwork of several disparate groups that shared little in common apart from being intent on undoing the purportedly nefarious effects of the I96OS. Military officers intent on reha- bilitating their profession; intellectuals fearing that the loss of confidence at home was paving the way for the triumph of totalitarianism abroad; reli- gious leaders dismayed by the collapse of traditional moral standards; strategists wrestling with the implications of a humiliating defeat that had undermined their credibility; politicians on the make; purveyors of pop cul- turc looking to make a buck: as early as 1980, each saw military power as the apparent answer to any number of problems. The process giving rise to the new American militarism was not a neat one. Where collaboration made sense, the forces of reaction found the means to cooperate. But on many occasions-for example, on questions relating to women or to grand strategy-nominally "pro-military" groups worked at cross purposes. Confronting the thicket of unexpected developments that marked the decades after Vietnam, each tended to chart its own course. In many respects, the forces of reaction failed to achieve the specific objectives that first roused them to act. To the extent that the 19603 upended long-standing conventions relating to race, gender, and sexuality, efforts to mount a cultural counterrevolution failed miserably. Where the forces of reaction did achieve a modicum of success, moreover, their achievements often proved empty or gave rise to unintended and unwelcome conse- quences. Thus, as we shall see, military professionals did regain something approximating the standing that they had enjoyed in American society prior to Vietnam. But their efforts to reassert the autonomy of that profession backfired and left the military in the present century bereft of meaningful influence on basic questions relating to the uses of U.S. military power. Yet the reaction against the 1960s did give rise to one important by-prod: uct, namely, the militaristic tendencies that have of late come into full flower. In short, the story that follows consists of several narrative threads. No single thread can account for our current outsized ambitions and infatua- tion with military power. Together, however, they created conditions per- mitting a peculiarly American variant of militarism to emerge. As an antidote, the story concludes by offering specific remedies aimed at restor- ing a sense of realism and a sense of proportion to U.S. policy. It proposes thereby to bring American purposes and American methods-especially with regard to the role of military power-into closer harmony with the nation's founding ideals. The marriage of military metaphysics with eschatological ambition is a misbegotten one, contrary to the long-term interests of either the American people or the world beyond our borders. It invites endless war and the ever-deepening militarization of U.S. policy. As it subordinates concern for the common good to the paramount value of military effectiveness, it promises not to perfect but to distort American ideals. As it concentrates ever more authority in the hands of a few more concerned with order abroad rather than with justice at home, it will accelerate the hollowing out of American democracy. As it alienates peoples and nations around the world, it will leave the United States increasingly isolated. If history is any guide, it will end in bankruptcy, moral as well as economic, and in abject failure. "Of all the enemies of public liberty," wrote James Madison in 1795, "war is perhaps the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies. From these proceed debts and taxes. And armies, debts and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few .... No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual Warfare." The purpose of this book is to invite Americans to consider the continued relevance of Madison's warning to our own time and circumstances.

**Our alternative is to reject the affs obsession with sovereign power in favor of questioning the sovereign’s ability to dictate the limits of acceptable violence – only a shift from homo sacer to whatever being solves**

Caldwell 2004 [Anne, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Louisville.] Bio-Sovereignty and the Emergence of Humanity Theory and Event 7:2. 48-53 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.2caldwell.html>]

Can we imagine another form of humanity, and another form of power? The bio-sovereignty described by Agamben is so fluid as to appear irresistible. Yet Agamben never suggests this order is necessary. Bio-sovereignty results from a particular and contingent history, and it requires certain conditions. Sovereign power, as Agamben describes it, finds its grounds in specific coordinates of life, which it then places in a relation of indeterminacy. What defies sovereign power is a life that cannot be reduced to those determinations: a life “that can never be separated from its form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked life. “ (2.3). In his earlier Coming Community, Agamben describes this alternative life as “whatever being.”More recently he has used the term “forms-of-life.” These concepts come from the figure Benjamin proposed as a counter to homo sacer: the “total condition that is ‘man’.” For Benjamin and Agamben, mere life is the life which unites law and life. That tie permits law, in its endless cycle of violence, to reduce life an instrument of its own power. The total condition that is [hu]man refers to an alternative life incapable of serving as the ground of law. Such a life would exist outside sovereignty. Agamben’s own concept of whatever being is extraordinarily dense. It is made up of varied concepts, including language and potentiality; it is also shaped by several particular dense thinkers, including Benjamin and Heidegger. What follows is only a brief consideration of whatever being, in its relation to sovereign power. “Whatever being,” as described by Agamben,lacks the features permitting the sovereign capture and regulation of life in our tradition. Sovereignty’s capture of life has been conditional upon the separation of natural and political life. That separation has permitted the emergence of a sovereign power grounded in this distinction, and empowered to decide on the value, and non-value of life (1998: 142). Since then, every further politicization of life, in turn, calls for “a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only ‘sacred life,’ and can as such be eliminated without punishment” (p. 139). This expansion of the range of life meriting protection does not limit sovereignty, but provides sites for its expansion. In recent decades, factors that once might have been indifferent to sovereignty become a field for its exercise. Attributes such as national status, economic status, color, race, sex, religion, geo-political position have become the subjects of rights declarations. From a liberal or cosmopolitan perspective, such enumerations expand the range of life protected from and serving as a limit upon sovereignty. Agamben’s analysis suggests the contrary. If indeed sovereignty is bio-political before it is juridical, then juridical rights come into being only where life is incorporated within the field of bio-sovereignty. The language of rights, in other words, calls up and depends upon the life caught within sovereignty: homo sacer. Agamben’s alternative is therefore radical. He does not contest particular aspects of the tradition. He does not suggest we expand the range of rights available to life. He does not call us to deconstruct a tradition whose power lies in its indeterminate status.21 Instead, he suggests we take leave of the tradition and all its terms. Whatever being is a life that defies the classifications of the tradition, and its reduction of all forms of life to homo sacer. Whatever being therefore has no common ground, no presuppositions, and no particular attributes. It cannot be broken into discrete parts; it has no essence to be separated from its attributes; and it has no common substrate of existence defining its relation to others. Whatever being cannot then be broken down into some common element of life to which additive series of rights would then be attached. Whatever being retains all its properties, without any of them constituting a different valuation of life (1993: 18.9).As a result, whatever being is “reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims) – and it is reclaimed not for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-such, for belonging itself.” (0.1-1.2).Indifferent to any distinction between a ground and added determinations of its essence, whatever being cannot be grasped by a power built upon the separation of a common natural life, and its political specification. Whatever being dissolves the material ground of the sovereign exception and cancels its terms. This form of life is less post-metaphysical or anti-sovereign, than a-metaphysical and a-sovereign. Whatever is indifferent not because its status does not matter, but because it has no particular attribute which gives it more value than another whatever being. As Agamben suggests, whatever being is akin to Heidegger’s Dasein. Dasein, as Heidegger describes it, is that life which always has its own being as its concern – regardless of the way any other power might determine its status. Whatever being, in the manner of Dasein, takes the form of an “indissoluble cohesion in which it is impossible to isolate something like a bare life. In the state of exception become the rule, the life of homo sacer, which was the correlate of sovereign power, turns into existence over which power no longer seems to have any hold” (Agamben 1998: 153).We should pay attention to this comparison. For what Agamben suggests is that whatever being is not any abstract, inaccessible life, perhaps promised to us in the future. Whatever being, should we care to see it, is all around us, wherever we reject the criteria sovereign power would use to classify and value life. “In the final instance the State can recognize any claim for identity – even that of a State identity within the State . . . What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without a representable condition of belonging” (Agamben 1993:85.6). At every point where we refuse the distinctions sovereignty and the state would demand of us, the possibility of a non-state world, made up of whatever life, appears.

# 1nc

**The President of the United States should issue an executive order transferring lead executive authority for non-battlefield targeted killing from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Joint Special Operations Command.**

**Transferring authority boosts transparency and intel without restricting strikes – solves the aff**

**Zenko 13**¸ Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Clip the Agency's Wings: Why Obama needs to take the drones away from the CIA,” April 16th, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/16/clip\_the\_agencys\_wings\_cia\_drones?utm\_source=feedly

Last month, Daniel Klaidman reported that three senior officials had told him that President Obama would gradually transfer targeted killings to the Pentagon during his second term. Other journalists report that this is not a certainty or that "it would most likely leave drone operations in Pakistan under the CIA," making any transition meaningless since over 80 percent of all U.S. targeted killings have occurred in Pakistan. But if Obama is serious about reforming targeted killing policies, as he has stated, then he needs to sign an executive order transferring lead executive authority for non-battlefield targeted killings from the CIA to the Defense Department. Doing this has three significant benefits for U.S. foreign policy. First, it would increase the transparency of targeted killings, including what methods are used to prevent civilian harm. Strikes by the CIA are classified as Title 50 "covert action," which under law are "activities of the United States Government...where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional...military activities." CIA operations purportedly allow for deniability about the U.S. role, though this rationale no longer applies to the highly-publicized drone campaign in Pakistan, which Obama personally acknowledged in January 2012. Beyond adjectives in public speeches ("methodical," "deliberate," "not willy-nilly"), the government does not, and cannot, describe the procedures and rules for CIA targeted killings. JSOC operations in Somalia and Yemen, on the other hand, fall under the Title 10 "armed forces" section of U.S. law, which the White House reports as "direct action" to Congress. The United States has also acknowledged clandestine military operations to the United Nations "against al-Qaida terrorist targets in Somalia in response to on-going threats to the United States." Moreover, JSOC operations are guided by military doctrine, available to the public in Joint Publication 3-60 (JP 3-60): Joint Targeting. (While the complete 2007 edition can be found online, only the executive summary of the most-recent version, released on January 31, is available. If the Joint Staff's J-7 Directorate for Joint Force Development posted this updated edition in its entirety -- or fulfilled my FOIA request [case number 13-F-0514] -- that would be appreciated.) JP 3-60 matters because it details each step in the targeting cycle, including the fundamentals, processes, responsibilities, legal considerations, and methods to reduce civilian casualties. This degree of transparency is impossible for CIA covert actions. Second, it would focus the finite resources and bandwidth of the CIA on its primary responsibilities of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning. Last year, the President's Intelligence Advisory Board -- a semi-independent executive branch body, the findings of which rarely leak -- reportedly told Obama that "U.S. spy agencies were paying inadequate attention to China, the Middle East and other national security flash points because they had become too focused on military operations and drone strikes." This is not a new charge, since every few years an independent group or congressional report determines that "the CIA has been ignoring its core mission activities." But, as Mark Mazzetti shows in his indispensable CIA history, the agency has evolved from an organization once deeply divided at senior levels about using armed drones, to one that is a fully functioning paramilitary army. As former senior CIA official Ross Newland warns, the agency's armed drones program "ends up hurting the CIA. This just is not an intelligence mission." There is no longer any justification for the CIA to have its own redundant fleet of 30 to 35 armed drones. During White House debates of CIA requests in 2009, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeatedly asked: "Can you tell me why we are building a second Air Force?" Obama eventually granted every single request made by then-Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta, adding: "The CIA gets what it wants." With this year's proposed National Intelligence Program budget scheduled to fall by 8 percent, an open checkbook for Langley is not sustainable or strategically wise.

# 1nc

**Congressional restrictions cause adversaries to doubt the credibility of our threats --- causes crisis escalation**

Matthew Waxman 8/25/13, Professor of Law @ Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy @ CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that any serious restrictions on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive confrontations.”178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. … [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate.179

**Perception of weak Presidential crisis response collapses heg**

John R. Bolton 9, Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute & Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, “The danger of Obama's dithering,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/18/opinion/oe-bolton18

Weakness in American foreign policy in one region often invites challenges elsewhere, because our adversaries carefully follow diminished American resolve. Similarly, presidential indecisiveness, whether because of uncertainty or internal political struggles, signals that the United States may not respond to international challenges in clear and coherent ways. Taken together, weakness and indecisiveness have proved historically to be a toxic **combination for America's global interests**. That is exactly the combination we now see under President Obama. If anything, his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize only underlines the problem. All of Obama's campaign and inaugural talk about "extending an open hand" and "engagement," especially the multilateral variety, isn't exactly unfolding according to plan. Entirely predictably, we see more clearly every day that diplomacy is not a policy but only a technique. **Absent** presidential leadership, **which at a minimum** means clear policy direction and persistence in the face of criticism and adversity, **engagement simply embodies** weakness and indecision.

**Readiness collapse goes nuclear**

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. **security** commitments are unnecessary **for peace** is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

# Solvency

**Obama will circumvent the plan**

**Lohmann 13** [Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” 1/28, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>]

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

# Drone prolif

**Drone prolif inevitable**

**Etzioni ‘13** [Amitai, professor of international relations at George Washington University, “The Great Drone Debate,” March-April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>]

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of selfconstraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology.

**No modeling- US signals are dismissed, social science proves**

Zenko ‘13 [Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the\_signal\_and\_the\_noise, accessed 6-12-13, mss]

Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: "Once you reduce the presence in the region, you could very well signal the wrong things to our adversaries." Sen. Kelly Ayotte echoed his observation, claiming that President Obama's plan to withdraw 34,000 thousand U.S. troops from Afghanistan within one year "leaves us dangerously low on military personnel...it's going to send a clear signal that America's commitment to Afghanistan is going wobbly." Similarly, during a separate House Armed Services Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ominously warned of the possibility of sequestration: "Perhaps most important, the world is watching. Our friends and allies are watching, potential foes -- all over the world." These routine and unchallenged assertions highlight what is perhaps the most widely agreed-upon conventional wisdom in U.S. foreign and national security policymaking: the inherent power of signaling. This psychological capability rests on two core assumptions: All relevant international audiences can or will accurately interpret the signals conveyed, and upon correctly comprehending this signal, these audiences will act as intended by U.S. policymakers. Many policymakers and pundits fundamentally believe that the Pentagon is an omni-directional radar that uniformly transmits signals via presidential declarations, defense spending levels, visits with defense ministers, or troop deployments to receptive antennas. A bit of digging, however, exposes cracks in the premises underlying signaling theories. There is a half-century of social science research demonstrating the cultural and cognitive biases that make communication difficult between two humans. Why would this be any different between two states, or between a state and non-state actor? Unlike foreign policy signaling in the context of disputes or escalating crises -- of which there is an extensive body of research into types and effectiveness -- policymakers' claims about signaling are merely made in a peacetime vacuum. These signals are never articulated with a precision that could be tested or falsified, and thus policymakers cannot be judged misleading or wrong. Paired with the faith in signaling is the assumption that policymakers can read the minds of potential or actual friends and adversaries. During the cycle of congressional hearings this spring, you can rest assured that elected representatives and expert witnesses will claim to know what the Iranian supreme leader thinks, how "the Taliban" perceives White House pronouncements about Afghanistan, or how allies in East Asia will react to sequestration. This self-assuredness is referred to as the illusion of transparency by psychologists, or how "people overestimate others' ability to know them, and...also overestimate their ability to know others." Policymakers also conceive of signaling as a one-way transmission: something that the United States does and others absorb. You rarely read or hear critical thinking from U.S. policymakers about how to interpret the signals from others states. Moreover, since U.S. officials correctly downplay the attention-seeking actions of adversaries -- such as Iran's near-weekly pronouncement of inventing a new drone or missile -- wouldn't it be safer to assume that **the majority of U.S. signals are** similarly **dismissed**? During my encounters with foreign officials, few take U.S. government pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences.

**Drone prolif doesn’t escalate**

**Singh ’12** [Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security, an independent and non-partisan organization that focuses on researching and analyzing national security and defense policies, also a research assistant at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America, is a War and Peace Fellow at the Dickey Center, a global research organization, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” 8-13-12, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/>]

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.¶ Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones:¶ – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue.¶ – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose.¶ – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face.¶ – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts.¶ In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.¶ Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

**China won’t use drones aggressively- rationality checks**

**Erickson and Strange 13** [Andrew Erickson is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, Austin Strange is a researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, “China has drones. Now how will it use them?” 5-29, <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html>]

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Myanmar drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the anti-drug bureau in China's Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham's mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham's capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorisation is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorisation, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries' sovereignty - something Beijing regularly decries when others do it. The limitations on China's drone use are reflected in the country's academic literature on the topic. The bulk of Chinese drone research is dedicated to scientific and technological topics related to design and performance. The articles that do discuss potential applications primarily point to major combat scenarios -such as a conflagration with Taiwan or the need to attack a US aircraft carrier - which would presumably involve far more than just drones. Chinese researchers have thought a great deal about the utility of drones for domestic surveillance and law enforcement, as well as for non-combat-related tasks near China's contentious borders. Few scholars, however, have publicly considered the use of drone strikes overseas.¶ Yet there is a reason why the United States has employed drones extensively despite domestic and international criticism: it is much easier and cheaper to kill terrorists from above than to try to root them out through long and expensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Some similar challenges loom on China's horizon. Within China, Beijing often considers protests and violence in the restive border regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, to constitute terrorism. It would presumably consider ordering precision strikes to suppress any future violence there. Even if such strikes are operationally prudent, China's leaders understand that they would damage the country's image abroad, but they prioritise internal stability above all else. Domestic surveillance by drones is a different issue; there should be few barriers to its application in what is already one of the world's most heavily policed societies. China might also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airspace without authorisation if the risk of detection were low enough; it already deploys intelligence-gathering ships in the exclusive economic zones of Japan and the United States, as well as in the Indian Ocean.¶ Still, although China enjoys a rapidly expanding and cutting-edge drone fleet, it is bound by the same rules of the game as the rest of the military's tools. Beyond surveillance, the other non-lethal military actions that China can take with its drones are to facilitate communications within the Chinese military, support electronic warfare by intercepting electronic communications and jamming enemy systems, and help identify targets for Chinese precision strike weapons, such as missiles. Beijing's overarching approach remains one of caution - something Washington must bear in mind with its own drone programme.

**No South China Sea conflict or escalation – their evidence is media exagerration**

**Kania 13** – The Harvard Political Review is a journal of politics and public policy published by the Institute of Politics, cites Andrew Ring, a former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow, and Peter Dutton, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College (Elsa, 01/11, “The South China Sea: Flashpoints and the U.S. Pivot,” http://harvardpolitics.com/world/the-south-china-sea-flashpoints-and-the-u-s-pivot/)

Equilibrium and Interdependence? One paradox at the heart of the South China Sea is the uneasy equilibrium that has largely been maintained. **Despite** the occasional confrontation and **frequent** diplomatic **squabbling, the situation has never escalated into full-blown physical conflict**. The main stabilizing factor has been that the countries involved have too much to lose from turmoil, and so much to gain from tranquility. Andrew Ring—former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow—emphasized that “With respect to the South China Sea, we all have the same goals” in terms of regional stability and development. With regional **trade flows and interdependence** critical to the region’s growing economies, conflict could be devastating. Even for China—the actor with by far the most to gain from such a dispute—taking unilateral action would **irreparably tarnish its image** in the eyes of the international community. With the predominant narrative of a “rising” and “assertive China”—referred to as a potential adversary by President Obama in the third presidential debate—China’s behavior in the South China Sea may be sometimes **exaggerated or sensationalized**. Dr. Auer, former Naval officer and currently Director of the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at the Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, told the HPR that “China has not indicated any willingness to negotiate multilaterally” and remains “very uncooperative.” Across its maritime territorial disputes—particularly through recent tensions with Japan in the East China Sea—Auer sees China as having taken a very aggressive stance, and he claims that “Chinese behavior is not understandable or clear.” Nonetheless, in recent incidents, such as a standoff between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal this past April, as Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, emphasized, “this is not an either or.” Multiple parties are responsible for the tensions, yet the cycle of action and reaction is **often obscured**. Nonetheless, Glaser believes that “The Chinese have in every one of these cases overreacted—they have sought to take advantage of the missteps of other countries,” responding with disproportionate coercion. In addition, China has begun to use methods of “economic coercion” to assert its interests against trade partners. A Tipping Point? Has the dynamic in the South China Sea shifted recently? Perhaps not in a fundamental sense. But with the regional military buildup, governments have developed a greater capacity to pursue longstanding objectives. According to Peter Dutton, Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, “China’s recent behavior in the East China Sea and assertive policy in the South China Sea” is “a serious concern.” He believes that China’s willingness to resort to force in defense of its territorial claims has been increasing over time, partially as a consequence of its rising power. As such, Dutton sees the situation as reaching a “tipping point in which China is…no longer satisfied with shelving the dispute.” Is confrontation or resolution imminent? Worryingly, Dutton observes, “the international dynamic in the region is motivated largely by fear and anger.” However, **the use of unilateral military force would be a lose-lose for China**,” particularly in terms of its credibility, both among its neighbors and in the international community. The Pivot in the South China Sea From a U.S. perspective, a sustained American presence in the region has long been the underpinning of peace and stability. However, excessive U.S. intervention could disrupt the delicate balance that has been established. Although the U.S. has always sought to maintain a position of neutrality in territorial disputes, remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea” led China to challenge U.S. impartiality. If the U.S. engages with its regional allies without seeking enhanced engagement with China, then U.S. actions in the region may be perceived by China as efforts at containment. Moreover, as the U.S. strengthens ties to partners in the region, there is risk of entanglement if conflict were to break out. There has long been an undercurrent of tension between the Philippines and China—most recently displayed in the standoff over the Scarborough Shoal in May 2012. Shortly thereafter, in a visit to Washington D.C., President Aquino sought U.S. commitment to military support of the Philippines in the event of conflict with China on the basis of the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty. However, despite providing further military and naval support, the U.S. has refrained from making concrete commitments. Although the U.S. would not necessarily be dragged into a dispute, if a confrontation did break out, it might feel compelled to respond militarily to maintain the credibility of commitments to allies and partners in the region. Strong ties to the U.S. and enhanced military capacity could also provoke more confrontational behavior from U.S. partners. Yet, Ring emphasizes that the U.S. navy and military are also unique in the “ability to facilitate military cooperation and communication among all of the claimants” and particularly to “be that bridge…uniquely situated to build some flows of communication” **that could facilitate a peaceful resolution to future incidents.**

**Caucus conflict won’t escalate**

Collins and Wohlforth ‘4 (Kathleen, Professor of Political Science – Notre Dame and William, Professor of Government – Dartmouth, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations”, Strategic Asia 2003-4: Fragility and Crisis, p. 312-313, 2004)

Conclusion The popular great game lens for analyzing Central Asia fails to capture the declared interests of the great powers as well as the best reading of their objective interests **in security and economic growth**. Perhaps more importantly, it fails to explain their actual behavior on the ground, as well the specific reactions of the Central Asian states themselves. **Naturally, there are competitive elements** in great power relations. Each country’s policymaking community has slightly different preferences for tackling the challenges presented in the region, and the more influence they have the more able they are to shape events in concordance with those preferences. **But these clashing preferences concern the means to serve ends that all the great powers share.** To be sure, policy-makers in each capital would prefer that their own national firms or their own government’s budget be the beneficiaries of any economic rents that emerge from the exploitation and transshipment of the region’s natural resources. But the scale of these rents is marginal even for Russia’s oil-fueled budget. And for taxable profits to be created, the projects must make sense economically—something that is determined more by markets and firms than governments. Does it matter? The great game is an arresting metaphor that serves to draw people’s attention to an oft-neglected region. The problem is the great-game lens can distort realities on the ground, and therefore bias analysis andpolicy. For when great powers are locked in a competitive fight, the issues at hand matter less than their implication for the relative power of contending states. Power itself becomes the issue—one that tends to be nonnegotiable. Viewing an essential positive-sum relationship through zero sum conceptual lenses will result in missed opportunities for cooperation that leaves all players—not least the people who live in the region—poorer and more insecure. While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least conditional and relative optimism. Given the confluence of **their** chief strategic interests, the major powers are in a better position to serve as a stabilizing force than analogies to the Great Game or **the Cold War** would suggest. It is important to stress that the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror attacks was increased cooperation between local governments and China and Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, **another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less cooperation among the major powers**. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan [The Stans] are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that “great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’ relations that have taken place since September 11, as well **as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.**

# Terror

**AQAP dead- drones**

Hienz, 8-29 – Defense Media Network counterterrorism reporter

[Justin, owner of Cogent Writing, LLC, a strategic content company, and he is the executive editor for Security Debrief, a blog on homeland and national security, "Is Al Qaeda in Yemen Becoming More Dangerous? Short answer: nope," Defense Media Network, 8-29-13, www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/is-al-qaeda-in-yemen-becoming-more-dangerous/, accessed 9-18-13, mss]

Is Al Qaeda in Yemen Becoming More Dangerous? Short answer: nope The U.S. Embassy in Yemen is now offering limited public services. It is the final U.S. embassy to reopen following an intercepted message between high-ranking al Qaeda leaders that indicated a major attack was in the works. Today, that threat appears to be somehow mitigated, given the embassy reopening, but over the last chaotic two or so weeks, public attention has returned to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which had dropped below much of the world’s radar for its inactivity and relative silence. While AQAP remains one of the more dangerous al Qaeda affiliates, it is important to put this recent threat in perspective. There are many intelligence and military elements in play that leave AQAP – rather than the United States – in a perilous position. AL QAEDA’S OMINOUS MESSAGE The message that sparked the wave of embassy closings was between Ayman al Zawahiri, the head of core al Qaeda thought to be hiding in Pakistan, and AQAP leader Nasir al Wuhayshi, who Zawahiri recently named as al Qaeda’s global second in command. While most details of the message have not been released, it has been reported that Zawahiri told Wuhayshi to “do something,” launching attacks in unidentified locations. This message came on the heels of intelligence indicating a possible major attack in Yemen, as well as July prison breaks in Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, which have been generally attributed to al Qaeda elements. The message also coincided with the end of Ramadan, the Islamic holy month of fasting, making it an auspicious time for al Qaeda extremists to martyr themselves. Thus, when U.S. intelligence intercepted the message sent through al Qaeda’s encrypted instant messaging program (called “Asrar al-Dardashah” or “Secrets of the Chat”), there was a sense that something big was coming. The U.S. embassy closings were an attempt to buy time – to remove potential targets while U.S. intelligence gathered more information and worked to capture or otherwise eliminate those plotting the attacks. Given last year’s attack on a U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya, which killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Obama Administration was especially concerned with avoiding a similar attack – for the safety and security of America’s diplomatic corps, as well as, perhaps for the political ramifications another successful attack would cause. A senior official in the Yemeni Interior Ministry said: “I think the American administration took such extreme precautionary measures to avert any possibility of a repetition of the Libyan scenario, for which it came under fierce Republican criticism. It appears it’s still haunted by that incident.” He added: “AQAP is definitely weaker than it was in 2011…If the Americans think it’s more dangerous, then they might see what we can’t, or are more knowledgeable than we are about the Yemeni security situation, which can’t be true.” BACKS AGAINST THE WALL To be sure, Zawahiri and Wuhayshi are not chatting away on their smartphones or carrying on in-depth conversations while perched in front of a keyboard. Rather, they are likely passing messages to couriers who in turn share them with other couriers. Rita Katz, director of SITE Intelligence Group, told the Washington Post: “I am sure they are delivering messages, through the message boards or by sending emails that are encrypted. But there is no way in my mind that Zawahiri or Wahishi have access to the Internet, and I think Wahishi, at this stage of his life, is even afraid of going outside.” Afraid to go outside because U.S. drones, run by the CIA, are constantly seeking targets in Yemen. Since the message was intercepted, U.S. drone strikes have increased dramatically. The official line from Washington is that Predator UAV strikes have killed 22 people in Yemen since the start of the year, but some estimates suggest drone strikes killed 37 people in Yemen during the first two weeks in August. Overall, air and drone strikes have taken out between 632 and 1,231 people in Yemen since December 2009. Meanwhile, with the recent disclosures about the vast use of the NSA’s digital intelligence gathering operations – and the apparent ability of U.S. intelligence to read messages on al Qaeda’s not-so-secret-after-all forums – if Zawahiri or Wuhayshi use the Internet or phone, they run a real risk of drawing a Predator’s missile to their exact location. This does not preclude AQAP or another al Qaeda affiliate from coordinating and launching an attack, but it certainly frustrates the process. After the Arab Spring and the ouster of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, AQAP militants seized control of two towns in Abyan Province, east of Aden. The group also increased recruitment efforts. These gains, however, were short lived. A recent push by the Yemeni military (with the help of U.S. drones) has managed to take back control, and of late, AQAP has achieved little else. On August 4, dozens of al Qaeda militants disguised in army uniforms assembled in a grandiose attempt to take control of the al-Dabbah oil export terminal in Hadramout, the Balhaf liquid natural gas (LNG) export terminal and the city of Mukalla. One of the plot’s goals was to kill or capture foreign workers at the facilities. The army completely disrupted the attack. On August 11, militants killed four Yemeni soldiers who were sleeping at a checkpoint leading to the Balhaf LNG facility, likely in retribution for the failed attack a week earlier. The checkpoint was one of several leading to the facility, which is heavily guarded. There was little chance a small group of militants could have infiltrated or disrupted the facility itself. They fled after killing the guards. On August 14, about 70 militants (linked with al Qaeda) swarmed into Hawtah, a city in the south, attempting to take control of the city’s western neighborhoods. The militants were met with military tanks, which surrounded the neighborhood where the militants had taken cover and put an end to the attack. On August 21, militants (described by Saba, Yemen’s state news agency, as “terrorist elements”) shot and killed Col. Ali Hadi, the Aden intelligence chief, also killing his son in the attack. The assassination may have some short-term impact on counterterrorism work in Yemen, but intelligence gathering in the country’s south will undoubtedly continue unabated. These kinds of hit-and-run attacks are the last option of a group with limited capabilities. Though lacking any victories on which to champion their dwindling cause, AQAP leaders took to the Internet. Wuhayshi said in a video (ostensibly directed at al Qaeda followers though also created as a piece of propaganda) that his group was poised to break followers out of prison. He said: “The imprisonment will not last and the chains will be broken…Your brothers are about to bring down the walls and thrones of evil … and victory is within reach.” Sure it is. Had the Sept. 11, 2012 attack in Benghazi not occurred, would the unprecedented embassy closings have taken place? What is more, if the embassies had not been closed, would there have been a resurgent concern for AQAP’s ability to launch attacks? That rhetoric rings hollow in the aftermath of a series of total operational failures. Soon after Wuhayshi’s video, American al Qaeda member Adam Gadahn released his own video, calling for attacks on U.S. diplomats. He also championed the group that attacked the Libyan embassy, killing Ambassador Stevens. In both cases, AQAP is capitalizing on the international attention received through the embassy closings, but their videos do not mean they have the capacity to achieve their goals. NOT YOUR FATHER’S AL QAEDA Putting the puzzle pieces together, there are a few conclusions that can be drawn about AQAP. First, the intercepted message with Zawahiri was likely not an empty threat. The series of attempted attacks in Yemen, particularly on August 4, must have been planned in advance, and Zawahiri’s message could have been the go-ahead to proceed. Whether the plans included an attack on a U.S. embassy remains unclear. Second, following the series of failures and increased drone attacks, AQAP again found itself against the ropes with nothing gained and not many options to continue efforts on a large scale. As result, it released two videos in an attempt to herald its goals while masking its inability to achieve them. Gadahn’s message calling for like-minded terrorists to attack U.S. diplomats is dangerous as a piece of propaganda, but it hardly equates to any real capacity on AQAP’s part. Third, it would seem the embassy closings were to some degree motivated by a fear of another Benghazi attack. An order from Zawahiri is certainly threatening, but the question remains: Had the Sept. 11, 2012 attack in Benghazi not occurred, would the unprecedented embassy closings have taken place? What is more, if the embassies had not been closed, would there have been a resurgent concern for AQAP’s ability to launch attacks? Closing embassies and the resulting media coverage gave AQAP the spotlight it desperately wants. Certainly they remain a dangerous organization, but it is important to keep them in perspective. Even as Yemen militants plot terror, it is AQAP that should be afraid.

**Geographic restrictions doom counter-terror – creates safe havens**

Blank, 10 – Emory University School of Law International Humanitarian Law Clinic director

[Laurie, "Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat," Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, 9-16-10, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1677965, accessed 8-19-13, mss]

The ramifications of including areas within the zone of combat, such as the accompanying authority to use lethal force as a first resort, raise a variety of policy considerations. The two primary considerations weigh directly against each other and perhaps, as a result, lend credence to the need for a middle ground in defining the zone of combat. First, some argue that creating geographic limits to the battlefield has the problematic effect of granting terrorists a safe haven. For example, a member of al Qaeda can be a legitimate target as a result of continuous participation in hostilities, thus losing any immunity from attack he might have had by dint of being a civilian.105 If the zone of combat is limited geographically to certain areas, then this member of al Qaeda can avoid being targeted—and thus regain civilian immunity, in essence—simply by crossing an international border even while remaining active in a terrorist organization engaged in a conflict with the U.S.106 Geographic limits designed to curtail the use of governmental military force thus effectively grant terrorists a safe haven and extend the conflict by enabling them to regroup and continue their attacks.

**Safe havens key to global operations**

CRT, 6 [Country Reports on Terrorism, annual report published by the U.S. Department of State, "Chapter 3 -- Terrorist Safe Havens," 4-28-6, www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2005/, accessed 8-19-13, mss]

Physical safe havens provide security for many senior terrorist leaders, allowing them to plan and to inspire acts of terrorism around the world. The presence of terrorist safe havens in a nation or region is not necessarily related to state sponsorship of terrorism. In most instances cited in this chapter, areas or communities serve as terrorist safe havens despite the government’s best efforts to prevent this. Denying terrorists safe haven plays a major role in undermining terrorists’ capacity to operate effectively, and thus forms a key element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy as well as the cornerstone of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 that was adopted in September 2001. UNSCR 1373 specifically targets terrorists’ ability to move across international borders and find safe haven, to solicit and move funds, and to acquire weapons; it also calls on states that do not have laws criminalizing terrorist activity and support to enact such laws.

**Self-interest makes allied coop inevitable- Iraq proves**

Boot, 4 -- CFR senior fellow [Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Less Respect, More Success," CFR, 9-6-4, www.cfr.org/terrorism/less-respect-more-success/p7304, accessed 8-18-13, mss]

Where Kerry is dead wrong, demonstrably wrong, is in suggesting that this unpopularity is taking a heavy toll on America's efforts to win the war on terrorism. Actually, by all indications, the United States is now getting significantly more cooperation in fighting terrorists than it ever did in the balmy days of Bill Clinton, who did all the sweet multilateral things that Kerry endorses— trying to broker an Israeli-Palestinian accord, signing the Kyoto global warming treaty, not offending "Old Europe" or threatening the power of Middle Eastern autocrats. Early last week, Pakistan announced the arrest of a dozen Islamist radicals who had been plotting attacks on the U.S. embassy and other targets. This comes shortly after the capture of some 25 other jihadists, including a computer expert, Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, whose arrest led to the exposure of an al Qaeda cell in Britain that was said to be plotting attacks on New York, Newark, and Washington. Recall that until 9/11 Pakistan was a leading supporter of Islamist militants. Portions of its intelligence service and military maintain their links with these fanatics, but Islamabad has become much more responsive to U.S. concerns. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which turned a blind eye to Islamist terrorism in the 1990s, has been capturing and killing many leading al Qaeda members. In 2002, a Council on Foreign Relations task force rapped the Saudis for not cracking down on terrorist financing. This June, the task force released a follow-up study that found the Saudis, while still far from perfect, had greatly improved: "Saudi Arabia has taken important actions to disrupt domestic al Qaeda cells and has improved and increased tactical law enforcement and intelligence cooperation with the United States, though important questions of political will remain." Europe, too, is offering unprecedented cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism, even though many Europeans disagree with U.S. actions in Iraq and elsewhere. Many European countries have passed tough laws that enable them to prosecute or expel supporters of terrorism even if they are not directly implicated in any attacks. French and German forces are serving alongside the U.S. military in Afghanistan and in the waters off Africa and the Arabian peninsula. Both France and Germany, along with many other countries, are also cooperating with the United States in the Proliferation Security Initiative designed to stop nuclear smuggling. This effort paid big dividends with the discovery last year that Abdul Khadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, was selling nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. The exposure of Libya's nuclear program led Muammar Qaddafi to renounce all support of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction— one of the biggest victories ever in the fight against nuclear proliferation. What's going on here? Why are countries from Pakistan to Portugal doing so much to help the United States if George W. Bush has purportedly done so much to alienate them? Chalk it up to pure self-interest. Many nations have come to realize, as they never did in the past, that Islamist terrorists pose a mortal threat to them. Saudi Arabia has significantly boosted its fight against al Qaeda since two attacks in Riyadh in May 2003. Pakistan has done much more since President Pervez Musharraf was almost killed in two assassination attempts in December 2003. Europe has boosted its cooperation since the March 11 bombing of the commuter trains in Madrid. When countries face a mega-threat like this, it doesn't make any difference how popular or unpopular the United States may be. They are happy to cooperate with the U.S. government, any U.S. government, even if it's led by a tough-talking Texan. Or perhaps especially if it's led by a tough-talking Texan.

**Turn- appeasement decreases cooperation- Bush proves**

Boot, 4 -- CFR senior fellow [Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Less Respect, More Success," CFR, 9-6-4, www.cfr.org/terrorism/less-respect-more-success/p7304, accessed 8-18-13, mss]

There was no question that the United States was better liked abroad in the 1990s, at least if public opinion surveys are to be believed, but was it more respected? When the Clinton administration went privately to Middle Eastern countries seeking cooperation against terrorism, it sometimes got significant help— the Jordanians, for instance, helped bust up the 2000 millennium plot. (Jordan has also been very helpful to the Bush administration.) But often the Clinton administration got the cold shoulder from governments that were wary of a fickle America that would likely flee at the first sign of adversity, as it had in Somalia after 18 commandos were killed in 1993. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were actively aiding the Taliban and perhaps even al Qaeda before 9/11 because they were more scared of alienating Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar than Bill Clinton. Bush's steely response to the 9/11 attacks helped change the calculus within these wavering states: They became more wary of trifling with the gunslinger in the White House than with his smooth-talking predecessor. Perhaps for this reason Bush got a good deal of tacit cooperation from Arab regimes even in the controversial overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, among others, hosted U.S. troops during Operation Iraqi Freedom), to say nothing of the broader war on terror. These regimes perceived that this time America was serious; it was not like the days of Clinton, when all the United States would do was lob a few cruise missiles and leave neighboring states to deal with the fallout.

**Zero risk of terrorism- their impact is alarmism**

Mueller ’12 (John, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, The Terrorism Delusion, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 81–110, Summer 2012)

Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. In 2005 an FBI report found that, despite years of well-funded sleuthing, the Bureau had yet to uncover a single true al-Qaida sleeper cell in the United States. The report was secret but managed to be leaked. Brian Ross, “Secret FBI Report Questions Al Qaeda Capabilities: No ‘True’ Al Qaeda Sleeper Agents Have Been Found in U.S.,” ABC News, March 9, 2005. Fox News reported that the FBI, however, observed that “just because there’s no concrete evidence of sleeper cells now, doesn’t mean they don’t exist.” “FBI Can’t Find Sleeper Cells,” Fox News, March 10, 2005. Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002. 47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.” 48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000. 49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders. 50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs. Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin. There is delusion, as well, in the legal expansion of the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” The concept had once been taken as a synonym for nuclear weapons or was meant to include nuclear weapons as well as weapons yet to be developed that might have similar destructive capacity. After the Cold War, it was expanded to embrace chemical, biological, and radiological weapons even though those weapons for the most part are incapable of committing destruction that could reasonably be considered “massive,” particularly in comparison with nuclear ones. 52

**No Russian War**

Weitz ‘11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>, September 27, 2011)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.